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INTRODUCTION
The Recent financial crisis has shaken most of the financial markets and institutions globally. Economic crisis and increasing competition force banks to act more efficiently. Increased competition influences banks to take more risk to keep in competition. Again escalations of risk draw the attention of the regulators who try to balance risktaking behavior through enforcing capital requirements of banks (Altunbas et al., 2007) . And human capital, that is employees are the main driving force of the banking industry. Proper management and efficiency of employees (subsequently human capital efficiency) can make the banks successful. Human capital efficiency refers the productivity of the employees in generating assets and income using cost and other resources of the organizations.
In fact, it is the measurement of how productive the employees are in generating resources and income using cost
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capital requirements considered as important determinants along with others. On the other hand, the risk is also treated as an important determinant along with other factors in measuring capital requirements and efficiency of banks. The financial crisis of Asia in 2007 validates the more in-depth look at the relationship between risk, capital, and efficiency of Asian Banks (Tan and Floros, 2013) . The existing literature examines the relationship between risk, the level of capital and efficiency yield conflicting conclusion because of the non-exclusive hypothesis of the study (Altunbas et al., 2001 ).
This study is the extension of previous works focusing efficiency, capital and risk measures. We consider Bangladesh as a sample country of Asia that was not previously addressed. Again considering two types efficiency measures this study depicts the importance of human capital efficiency and cost efficiency in bank risk and capital requirement decisions. The study is expected to explore empirically through constructing new facts and evidence and unfolding a new dimension of efficiency-human capital efficiency in Bangladesh as a sample country of Asia.
In the organization of the paper, Section 2 reviews the literature relevant to the study and development of hypothesis; Section 3 describes the data and methodology explaining the relationship between risk, capital and efficiency. Section 4 draws the empirical results, section 5 shows the test of robustness, and finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS
Ongoing debate that started in the early of the empirical research examining the relationship between risk, capital, and efficiency in developed countries still going on (Tan and Floros, 2013) . Different researchers come forward with unending and counterfactual conflicts whether efficiency has supremacy to risks or risks significantly influence the efficiency of banks (Altunbas et al., 2007) . Controversy also goes side by side whether optimum capital requirements reduce the level of risk or level of risk decides the optimum level of capital. Again consensus
conclusion not yet been done on the relationship between capital regulations and efficiency and level of risk and efficiency. Based on different debates of the previous study, review of literature survey has divided into following parts (1) Literature regarding the relationship between risk and efficiency, (2) Literature relating to the relationship between risk and capital regulation (3) Literature relating to the relationship between capital regulation and efficiency. Also, a hypothesis on managerial perspective discussed at the bottom part of the literature review.
The Relationship between Risk and Efficiency
The general expectation between risk and efficiency is negative. That means increased efficiency will manage risk substantially. So, a negative correlation is expected to observe in the study, but different outcome also found in the literature regarding this relationship. Different kind of research, for example, Berger and DeYoung (1997) ; Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) ; Berger and DeYoung (1997) ; Deelchand and Padgett (2010) ; Fiordelisi et al. (2011) and Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) among others spectacle negative relationship between the efficiency and risk. But opposite results also found in literature too. Literature mentioning positive relationship are Tan and Floros (2013) on China, Miah and Sharmeen (2015) on Bangladesh; Isshaq et al. (2015) on Ghana among others. Again literature dealing with bank efficiency linked by Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) evidencing the relevance of efficiency in determining risk.
Commenting differently, Altunbas et al. (2007) mention no significant relationship between inefficiency and risktaking behavior of commercial banks. To delve the relationship following hypotheses are constructed: H1:
There is a significant negative association between cost efficiency and risk of banks. H2:
There is a significant impact of human capital efficiency on the bank risk, i.e., negative relationship between efficiency and risk is expected. That means with the increase of human capital efficiency risk will be managed substantially. H3:
There is the significant positive impact of risk on the human capital efficiency, i.e., positive relationship between risk, and human capital efficiency is expected. That means it is expected that employees' of banks will act more efficiently with the increase of risk.
The Relationship between Capital Requirement and Risk
Up gradation of Basel accord with the passage of time, conveys a clear message to banking industry about the apparent relationship between risk and capital requirements. Although the debate is still going about the significance of capital in controlling risk. Sun and Chang (2011) opine that risk-averse banks are more likely to choose capital based finance than risk neutral banks to manage the risk level. It refers that capital base finance act as a mitigating risk tool. From the empirical evidence on 14 Islamic countries, Abdul et al. (2014) opine that capital requirement has a significant impact on the lending activities of bank and act as a shock absorber for credit risk.
Thus it is clear that capital has considerable influence on risk.
Some literature address the positive relation between risk and capital such as Ghosh (2014) ; Ahmad et al. Karels et al. (1989) address negative association between capital and risk. Again some authors define the relationship differently. Kim and Santomero (1988) demonstrate capital regulation is an ineffective tool in controlling risk. Rime (2001) opines that regulatory pressure on capital requirements has a significant impact on banks' behavior but no major impact of capital requirement found at risk. The mixed result also found in other studies, for example, Calem and Rob (1999) point out U-shape relationship between capital and risk. Iwatsubo (2007) opines that capital adequacy regulation does not preclude the risk-taking behavior of banks. No particular connection but capital management has a different effect on bank risktaking (Laeven and Levine, 2009) . Relevant hypotheses of examining the association are:
H4: There is a significant negative association between risk and capital regulation of banks.
The Relationship between Capital Requirement and Efficiency
Since capital is one of the costly sources of financing, efficiency becomes the relevant issue in determining the level of capital. Studies show the positive correlations between efficiency and level of capital are Manlagnit (2015) ; Pessarossi and Weill (2015) ; Fiordelisi et al. (2011); Chiu et al. (2008) ; Girardone et al. (2004) ; Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) ; Lee and Chih (2013) and Naceur and Omran (2011) among others.
On the contrary, evidence of Maji and De (2015) ; Deelchand and Padgett (2009); Altunbas et al. (2007) and Rao (2005) among others report negative relationships between efficiency and capital.
Again from the empirical study on Chinese banks, Lee and Chih (2013) show that capital regulations have a significant impact on the efficiency of large and small banks. But no meaningful relationship between capital and efficiency also trace out by few literature, for example, Guidara et al. (2013) and Zhang et al. (2008) . Guidara et al. (2013) opine that capital buffer or maintaining an excess of capital over minimum capital requirement is the outcome of market discipline and no substantial evidence shows an association of return on equity and capital buffer of banks. The relevant hypotheses for examining the relationships are: H5:
There is a significant positive relationship between the efficiency of cost and capital adequacy. H6:
There is the significant positive impact of the efficiency of human capital on capital adequacy. That means with the increase of human capital efficiency banks will able to maintain adequate regulatory capital. H7:
There is a significant impact of capital adequacy on human capital efficiency. A positive relationship is expected there. That means with the increase of capital banks will be more able to support efficient human capital.
Hypotheses in Managerial Perspective
Showing the inter-temporal relationship between risk, capital and efficiency of banks, Berger and DeYoung (1997) submitted four behavioral hypothesis namely: bad luck, bad management, skimping and moral hazard. As the objective of our paper is to observe the managerial behavior of Bangladesh through observing risk, capital and efficiency of banks, these four hypotheses are relevant to the study and can be summarized as below:
Bad luck hypothesis refers that problem loan is the outcome of external events. To manage the increasing amount of problem loans by putting additional efforts, managerial cost increases that reduce the efficiency of banks.
Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) address economic downturn as the possible reason for such external events of bad luck hypothesis. Associating the same relationship between risk and efficiency, bad management hypothesis holds that decrease in cost efficiency leads to an increase in credit risk. More specifically inappropriate monitoring and controlling of loan increase the cost inefficiency that points forward growing amount of nonperforming loans.
Skimping hypothesis depicts that the increase in cost efficiency by skimping resources devoted to underwriting and monitoring credit precedes an increase in insolvency risk. Under this hypothesis, growing trend of cost efficiency in the short run deteriorates loan quality in the long run. Again, moral hazard hypothesis holds that low capital ratio induces banks to take more risky project resulting increased credit risk in future.
DATE AND METHODOLOGY

Model Specification
SFA in determining efficiency is used in the study as also employed by Altunbas et al. (2007; 2001; ; Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997); Girardone et al. (2004) and Niţoi and Spulbar (2015) . This paper opted for production function Four equations specify empirical models of the study. In first two equations, both cost and human capital inefficiency are considered to observe the relationships. Riskit= αo+ α1CAPITALit+ α2INEFFj,it+ α3LTAit+ α4SIZEit + α5OBSTAit+ α6Riskit-1+ εit (1) CAPITALit = β0 + β1RISKit+ β2INEFFj,it + β3LTDit+ β4ROAit+ β5RDit + β6IRTAit+ β7RWATAit + β8CAPITALit-1 +εit (2) INEFFC it = ∂0 + ∂1RISKit + ∂2CAPITALit + ∂3Taxit + ∂4SIZEit + ∂5LTAit+ ∂6GOVS+∂7INEFFC it-1+ εit (3) INEFFHC it = µ0+µ1RISKit +µ2CAPITALit + µ3ROAit+ µ4DTAit +µ5LTAit+ µ6OBSTAit+ µ7INEFFHC it-1+ εit (4) Where,
The i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks, and t indicates the time dimension. NPLTL is used as a proxy for banking risk and CAPITAL (total eligible capital to total assets) is used as a proxy for banks capital regulation. INEFF is used as a proxy for bank inefficiency which is derived from SFA (For details see Appendix A). INEFFj,it refers cost inefficiency and human capital inefficiency respectively (j= cost, human capital) for bank i at period t. This study uses SIZE, OBSTA, ROA, Tax, LTA, GOVS, RWATA, IRTA, RD, LTD and DTA as control variables and 'ε' refers error components.
Equation (1) explains the effect of eligible capital and inefficiency in risk, whereas equation (2) shows how risk and inefficiency affect the level of bank's eligible capital. Finally, equations (3) and (4) examine the effect of capital and risk on inefficiency. Eleven bank-level control variables are used because these variables are relevant to explain the relationships between risk, capital regulation, and inefficiency. Since the study based on single country exposure, macroeconomic variables are avoided due to similar effect on all banks.
Data and Variable Description
Banking industry of Bangladesh composed of 56 banks 1 . Before commencing the analysis, all listed banks under DSE 2 and state-owned commercial banks were selected from 2000 to 2015. Since information of all banks was not available, finally 32 banks including four state-owned commercial banks are taken as a sample, considering at least last five years consequtive available data. One bank's information (ICB Commercial Bank) is intentionally dropped due to outlier effect. This study adopts unbalanced panel data not to lose degrees of freedom. All information is collected from DSE library, and some information is collected from Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk's company (web: www.bvdinfo.com), especially data that were not available in DSE library. Source: Authors' calculation by using SPSS-20 Table 1 represents the details of variables used in the study and Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables. The mean of risk (NPLTL-Non-performing loans to total loans and advances), is 7.25% and the average of CAPITAL (Total eligible capital to total assets) is about 7.68%, but minimum value is negative in the studied period. That means that sample banks failed to maintain minimum capital requirements over the studied period.
The mean value of cost inefficiency is about 0.1737 whereas human capital inefficiency is about 0. Among the independent variables, no correlation value 3 shows above 0.70 except LTA and LTD. Since these two independent variables are not used in the same model, so models are free from major multicollinearity problem.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents the empirical finding of simultaneous models that described in the data and methodology part where risk, capital, and inefficiency (Cost and Human capital) are the endogenous variables. Since in the models, the presence of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and serial correlations are observed, so GMM system panel estimator is applied developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) to get the best-fit result.
The estimated results from GMM estimator are presented in the following Table 3 , 4, 5, and 6. The coefficient of CAPITAL is significant and negatively related to risk in both models. The first model shows the cost inefficiency whereas next one shows human capital inefficiency. The coefficient of capital refers that small capitalized banks in Bangladesh are taking more risk than capitalized banks. This result supports previous studies showed negative relations between risk and capital mentioned in the literature review section. Moral hazard hypothesis becomes evident there due to the presence of deposit insurance benefit (Deelchand and Padgett, 2009 ).
Examining the Relationship between Capital Requirement and Efficiency on Risk
Cost inefficiency model reports that cost efficient banks are taking more risk than inefficient counterparts which also confirms the previous findings of Miah and Sharmeen (2015) on Bangladesh and nullify the bad management hypothesis in the banking industry of Bangladesh. Although, there is a positive relationship between human capital efficiency and risk, but the relationship is not significant. LTA, SIZE, RISK(-1) variables show significant and the same directional, i.e., positive relationship with risk in both inefficiency of cost and inefficiency of human capital model. But no significant association is observed with OBSTA and risk in either of the inefficiency models. Large banks are taking more risk than small banks as the coefficient of SIZE portrays the significant positive association.
Total loans and advances to total assets (LTA) are inversely related to bank risk, thereby indicates that loan growth is connected to the growth of nonperforming loans. The lag dependent variable of both models depicts that risk is persistently followed from the one year to the next year. Taking all together, the result of risk equations suggest that banks with more capital take less risk; and efficient banks are taking more risk than the less efficient counterpart. Both inefficiency models show a significant relationship with Capital and inefficiency, but human capital inefficiency shows negative correlation whereas cost inefficiency shows a positive relationship with capital. This refers that personnel efficiency of higher capitalized banks is greater than that of lower capitalized counterparts. Table 5 where dependent variable of this equation is the inefficiency of cost derived from SFA. The positive and significant coefficient of CAPITAL implies that capitalized banks are not as cost efficient as undercapitalized banks. This is evidencing positive relationship between capital and cost inefficiency in bi-direction; and contrast with the findings of Manlagnit (2015); Pessarossi and Weill (2015) and Fiordelisi et al. (2011) .
Examining the Relationship between Risk, And Efficiency on Capital Requirement
Examining the Relationship between Risk and Capital Requirement on Efficiency of Cost
GMM estimators of Equation 3 presents in
The coefficient of RISK shows the significant positive relationship with inefficiency of cost. It demonstrates that banks with more risk are more cost inefficient than bank having low risk. This result evidencing the positive association between risk and cost inefficiency of Zheng et al. (2017) on Asian Banks. Bad management hypothesis becomes evident in that case. Tax and LTA are not significantly relevant in measuring inefficiency of cost. SIZE refers that large banks are more cost-efficient than small banks in Bangladesh. Again positive relation with GOVS and cost inefficiency suggests that with more restriction on investing in government sectors reduces the cost efficiency of banks. Cost inefficiency of the current year is also the result of previous year cost inefficiency that shows the coefficient of lag variable INEFFC (-1). One possible reason for such behavior is that bank with more efficient human capital relies more on their human capital in monitoring and recovering loans. The regulatory capital of banks also shows a negative association with bank's inefficiency of human capital. In the context of Bangladeshi banking industry, the finding explains that capitalized banks are capable of holding more efficient human capital than low capitalized banks. Positive coefficient of ROA presents that human capital of less profitable banks acts more efficiently than more profitable banks. Bank level control variables deposit to total asset ratio (DTA) shows significant negative relationship with human capital inefficiency. It means banks with efficient human capital are more able to mobilize deposit than inefficient counterparts. But loan and advances to total asset (LTA) ratio shows no significant relations with human capital efficiency. The coefficient of off-balance sheet exposure to total assets (OBSTA) negatively associated with inefficiency of human capital, explaining that banks with active involvement in non-traditional activities hold more efficient human capital. Like cost efficiency, efficiency of human capital of Bangladeshi banks also significantly depends on previous year efficiency levels. This result suggests that human capital efficiency of banks accelerate with time duration.
Examining the Relationship between Risk and Capital on Efficiency of Human Capital
In Table 3 
TEST OF ROBUSTNESS
Robustness checks to validate the empirical result of GMM estimators is also conducted. Table 7, 8 and 9 present the regression results in robust tests. Using LLPTL (loan loss provisions to total loans and advances) instead of risk in cost inefficiency model of risk equation and change one independent variable CAPITAL as ETA (equity to total assets) in Human capital inefficiency model robust check performed to compare the result of Table 3 and Table 7 . Funding: This study received no specific financial support.
Competing Interests: The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Contributors/Acknowledgement: All authors contributed equally to the conception and design of the study.
By using intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) and by following (Deelchand and Padgett, 2009) we have developed the following multiproduct translog cost function to specify the cost function:
Ln TC = α + + + ½ + ½ + ε……………….
According to the Jondrow et al. (1982) the expected value of Un, on conditional εn, represents the cost-inefficiency of bank n (which is defined as Cn).
Where λ is the ratio of the standard deviation of Un to standard deviation of Vn, φ is the cumulative standard normal density function, and ϕ is the standard normal density function. Cn can be estimated by using equation (3).
We also use the alternative Human Capital inefficiency specification, where the dependent variable is the HCn =Human capital (no. of employees) of all banks in the sample. Qi indicates two outputs, i.e., Q1=Loans and advances, Q2= other earning assets, Pj stands for three input prices, i.e., P1= Price of labor which is the personnel expenses, P2= Price of operations, which is other operating expenses, P3= Price of risk-taking, which is the amount of nonperforming loans. The composite error term is now defined as Vn-Un. The general procedure for estimating production inefficiency in equation (3) is to estimate coefficients and the error term εn= Vn-Un first, and then calculate the efficiency for each observation in the sample. We just alter the error term to Vn-Un from Vn + Un to use the equation as production function (Coelli, 1996) . And here Un represents human capital inefficiency and assumed to be distributed independently of Vn and a half-normal distribution i.e., N (0, ). We use computer software called Frontier Version 4.1 developed by, Coelli (1996) 
